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Introduction 
 
Since the early 1990’s, passenger transport in New Zealand has been subject to a competitive 
tendering environment.  While this has led to greater efficiency in the application of public funding, 
concerns remain about the effectiveness of the passenger transport system in contributing to broader 
transport and urban development outcomes. 
 
As a result, attention has now turned towards better aligning public funding for passenger transport 
with the achievement of these outcomes.  A new approach, termed “Output Based Funding”, is in the 
process of being implemented in Auckland, New Zealand’s largest urban area.  This paper discusses 
the development behind this new purchasing system, with particular emphasis on the methods adopted 
to ensure that the advantages of a competitive market are retained. 
 
Background - The Auckland Region 
 
The Auckland region is home to 1.2 million people, and is New Zealand’s largest and fastest growing 
urban area.  The metropolitan area is relatively low density by international standards and has 
developed around the mobility that is made possible by the motor vehicle.  It has a high level of car 
ownership and a dispersed pattern of trip making reflecting a dispersed pattern of economic activity, a 
dispersed pattern of recreational and cultural destinations, and low density residential areas.  Major 
investment has been made in expanding and upgrading the road network over the last 40 years, but 
relatively little in expanding or upgrading the passenger transport network. 
 
Aucklanders are making more trips per person than ever before and a greater (and increasing) 
proportion of these trips are being made by cars.  At current trends, the use of cars is expected to 
double in the next twenty years.  While vehicle travel demand has increased, use of passenger 
transport has declined.  This has been fuelled by increases in car ownership, decentralised 
development, historic underinvestment in passenger transport infrastructure, reduction in the costs of 
motoring, and encouraged by motorists not paying the full costs of their road use. 
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The growth in vehicle travel demand has led to increased levels of traffic congestion.  In Auckland, 
congestion occurs mainly during peak-period travel, but some areas of the region are experiencing 
increasing congestion through the day. 
 
The economic cost of congestion to the region has been estimated at NZ$755 million per annum1.  In 
addition, it is causing significant environmental and social impacts. 
 
The Passenger Transport Regulatory Environment 
 
The Auckland Regional Council (ARC) is responsible for strategic transport planning and the 
purchase of passenger services that the market is unable to provide commercially.  The legislative 
framework for this in New Zealand was implemented from 1991, and was based on the model adopted 
in the United Kingdom (outside London) in the late 1980’s.  The law provides for what has become 
known as “commercial registrations”, and allows for competition “in the market”.  In effect, this 
means that operators are able to notify services which they intend to operate without the need for any 
public funding, but there are very few restrictions on competitors notifying services along the same 
routes.   
 
The legislation also provides for regional councils to “gap fill”, by competitively tendering for 
services which the market does not provide commercially.  All payments from the public purse for 
passenger transport must be subject to an approved competitive pricing procedure, which is approved 
by Transfund New Zealand, the national funding and regulatory agency for land transport.  Since the 
sale of the largest bus operator, the previously municipally owned Yellow Bus Company in late 1998, 
all service providers in Auckland are now in private ownership.   
 
Since 1994, there has been a steady increase in the proportion of services operated commercially in 
Auckland.  Approximately 40% of all services are now commercial, and these account for around 
55% passengers carried.  Managing the interface between commercial and contracted services is one 
of the key challenges facing the ARC.   
 
                                                 
1
 Ernst & Young, 1997; Alternative Transport Infrastructure Investments & Economic Development 
for the Auckland Region 
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Experience to Date 
 
Experience with the new passenger transport regime has been mixed.  The sharp increase in public 
expenditure evidenced during the 1980’s has been brought under control, with expenditure levels 
remaining broadly constant throughout the 1990’s.  This has occurred at a time when service levels 
have been increased, and is clearly a response to the reductions in unit costs that have arisen as a 
result of increased competition (and labour market reform which took place in New Zealand from the 
early 1990’s).  In addition, passenger numbers have increased since 1993, following a period of sharp 
decline from the mid 1980’s.  While a number of dynamics are at work here, it would appear that an 
important factor is the increase in levels of service that have been able to be achieved through the 
greater buying power of the public purse. 
 
Despite these advances however, concern remains in the region that passenger transport needs to do 
much better.  Continued strong growth in the population of the urban area (around 2.5% per annum 
for most of the 1990’s, and even stronger growth in vehicle trip making, at approximately 5% per 
annum, has meant that passenger transport’s share of the transport market has continued to fall.  
Between 1986 and 1996, passenger transport’s share of work journeys fell from 15% to just 7%.   
 
Concerns with Tendering System 
 
Despite the improved efficiencies that have been gained through the competitive tendering system, 
some concerns have been raised within the industry as to the sustainability of this approach.  In 
particular, operators are concerned at the lack of tenure afforded by contracts, the lack of incentives to 
build their business, and the “all or nothing” nature of tenders.   Operators are particularly concerned 
that despite the fact that there are price/quality trade-offs built into the tendering regime, the tendency 
has been for the lowest price bid to succeed.  In some past instances, this led to a reduction in service 
quality as under-resourced new entrants were awarded contracts on some routes, with the incumbent 
operator being forced to exit.  Faced with an inferior product, the users exercised what little choice 
they had by moving away from passenger transport altogether.  Some in the industry argued that had 
there been an opportunity for competition “in the market” rather than “for the market”, the choices 
available to users would have been more complete, and the damage inflicted by inferior quality 
operators would have been less. 
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Another area of concern was the extent to which innovation is encouraged by a “first past the post” 
tendering arrangement.  Although the opportunity exists to register commercial services (ie those that 
do not require any public funding), most new innovations require a degree of public funding, at least 
in the initial stages.  The concern in the industry was that if an open tender approach is necessary for 
such funding to be allocated, operators would be less likely to come forward with new ideas, as they 
had no guarantee that they would succeed through the bidding contest.   
 
From the operators perspective, a key concern at the current arrangements is the lack of incentive to 
invest in market development in an environment where: 
 
• Although contracts are net priced (ie the operator keeps the revenue), the investment required 
for new capital is often too high to be justified by the expected returns from the farebox alone.  
This is particularly the case during peak period services, where additional capital is generally 
required to increase supply. 
 
• There is a prospect of losing the contract at the end of the period of tenure.  An operator who 
is successful in growing the business may still lose out to another bidder who submits a lower 
price, either deliberately or accidentally. 
 
• The exclusive nature of contract tenure means that when another bidder is successful in 
securing routes, there is no opportunity to compete in the market, even if the competitor’s 
service may be deemed to be inferior. 
 
These concerns were highlighted in a number of submissions to the ARC between 1995 and 1997, and 
were echoed in other parts of the country. 
 
In addition, there are concerns at the tendency towards market dominance in each of the main sectors 
of the passenger transport market in Auckland. 
 
Increased Focus on Outcomes 
 
From the ARC’s perspective, there were also concerns at whether the tendering system was leading to 
the most effective use of its limited public funds.  A major objective of New Zealand’s passenger 
transport reforms in the early 1990’s was to improve the efficiency of public expenditure, following 
an alarming increase in subsidy levels during the 1980’s.  As noted above, this objective was 
achieved.  More recently, however, attention has turned to the effectiveness of this expenditure.  This 
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has arisen, in part, from an increased emphasis within local government on “outcomes” rather than 
“outputs”.   
 
As part of this process, the ARC issued a Strategic Plan in 1998, which set out six strategic outcomes, 
including the following accessibility outcome: 
 
“ A safe efficient and environmentally sustainable transport system that meets the accessibility needs 
of the people of the Auckland region”. 
 
One of the strategies to achieve this is to “ensure that viable pubic transport choices are available, and 
encourage the market to provide for these”. 
 
The strategic planning exercise highlights a shift away from the provision passenger transport services 
as an end in itself, to viewing them as an output that can assist in the delivery of the broader 
community outcomes.  The focus therefore is more on “why are we doing this?”, rather than “how are 
we doing this?”  In other words, a shift in emphasis from efficiency to effectiveness. 
 
The key focus for the Auckland region in the future will be how the passenger transport system can be 
better utilised to deliver on transport and urban sustainability objectives.  An important aspect of this 
in Auckland has been the development of a Regional Growth Strategy.  This has been a collaborative 
process by the regional, city and district councils in the Auckland region, to determine a preferred 
pattern of urban growth over the next fifty years.  The draft Regional Growth Strategy, which was 
released in July 1998, proposes a more intensive form of urban development into the future, and 
highlights the need for a supportive urban transport system.  An important element of this will be the 
need for passenger transport to be focused along major corridors, and to connect major growth 
centres.   
 
The Development of an Alternative 
 
As a result of these concerns, both from the public sector and the industry itself, there has been recent 
interest in developing an alternative competitive pricing arrangement which provides the right 
incentives for providers, and better aligns public funding with the objectives of the public agencies. 
 
It should be noted however, that such an approach relies on a clear understanding of why public 
funding is applied to passenger transport.  In many cases, this is not well articulated.  In Auckland, as 
in many other centres, the level and nature of intervention in the passenger transport market has arisen 
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from a series of ad hoc decisions and historical circumstances.  None of the objectives have been 
particularly well articulated, let alone quantified.  
 
Part of the strategic planning work referred to above has been an attempt to unravel these mixed 
objectives, and focus on the reasons why passenger transport receives public funding. The ARC’s 
consideration of this issue has determined that the principal function for passenger transport 
intervention in the Auckland region (if not now, then certainly in the future), is its role in managing 
the efficiency of the transport system, primarily through dealing with congestion. 
 
This emphasis suggests that the key performance indicator of the effectiveness of the passenger 
transport system relates to the number of peak period users.  This relies on the assumption that were it 
not for the presence of the subsidised service, a proportion of a passengers would used vehicles, 
thereby adding to the congestion.  Recent survey results in Auckland suggest that this is the case, 
especially for ferry and train users. 
 
A review of competitive pricing procedures for passenger transport was undertaken by Transfund in 
1997.  As part of this process, an industry working party progressed the concept of “Output Based 
Funding” as a possible solution to problems of the tendering system.  Transfund decided that the 
implementation of output based funding was outside of the scope of the CPP exercise, but agreed that 
further work should be done on the concept, with a view to developing a trial in some parts of the 
country. 
 
In the meantime, the ARC also introduced new competitive pricing procedures to allow for the 
purchase of trial services on a competitive basis.  These procedures allow operators to put forward 
proposals for new or innovative services, which competitive for access to a limited funding pool 
dedicated to such services. 
 
Output Based Funding 
 
Passenger transport funding is said to be output based if some or all of the payment to the operator is 
dependent on some measure of output.  This measure is generally consumption related, such as 
passenger journeys or passenger kilometres, but other measures are possible.  The rationale for output 
based funding is that by providing payments which are directly related to public transport use, 
operators will be given greater incentive to increase ridership, and thereby deliver the benefits from 
passenger transport which are primarily related to ridership. 
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The objectives identified for output based funding are therefore to: 
 
• Make services more responsive to customers. 
 
• Give operators more flexibility in service design. 
 
• Provide reward for effort in increasing ridership. 
 
• Provide longer term security. 
 
A review2 undertaken for the ARC and Transfund examined experience in other countries, 
particularly Australia, where partial output based funding has been introduced in a number of cities 
during the 1990’s.   
 
The review identified two alternative forms of output funding which could be progressed in the New 
Zealand context; these were “area contracts” and “subsidised deregulation”.  Under the area contract 
model, a tender process would be used to establish a single operator with exclusive rights to operate 
within a specified area, with the payment being related wholly or in part to the number of passengers 
or passenger kilometres carried.  This amount could be specified via a tender process, (ie competition 
“for the market”). 
 
Under “subsidised de-regulation”, the concept of operator exclusivity would be removed, and 
operators would be free to compete for business “in the market”.  Payment from public funds would 
be made on the basis of operators’ success in attracting patronage.  In effect, the objective would be to 
replicate a truly commercial market to the fullest extent possible.   
 
Following identification of the issues associated with output funding, proposals were put forward to 
introduce trials for both area contract and subsidised de-regulation in different parts of the Auckland 
region from late 1999.  Following further consultation however, the area contract concept was 
dropped, as it did not deal with the concerns over contract tenure, and it was agreed that it would be 
difficult to widely apply in other parts of the region, given the high level of existing commercial 
registrations.  (In effect, once a commercial registration has been notified, the operator has the right to 
continue to operate that regardless of any future contracts that may be awarded for service in the area.  
Because the area contract approach relies on the ability for the successful bidder to operate 
                                                 
2
 Booz-Allen & Hamilton, 1998:  Output-Based Funding for Passenger Transport Services:  
Discussion Paper 
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exclusively within an area, there is no guarantee that this could successfully be applied in areas where 
a large number of commercial registrations were already in place).   
 
Trialling “Subsidised De-regulation” 
 
The focus therefore turned to development of subsidised de-regulation for the trial.  The key question 
within this context was how to determine the unit payment amount.  This has two aspects: 
 
• The output unit to be used. 
• The method of determining the unit price. 
 
A rate per passenger kilometre is generally preferred as an output measure.  It is seen as being fairer 
for operators who carry passengers over long distances rather than using a flat per passenger rate.  It 
can, however, disadvantage operators who carry passengers by direct routes, such as express services, 
compared to more indirect routes.   To overcome this, it was determined that a rate per passenger fare 
stage be used.  This has the added advantage of being easier to monitor and audit.  For the purpose of 
their claims, therefore, operators will have to provide information that is structured in a manner that is 
consistent with the fare boundaries set by the ARC. 
 
Unlike the area contract approach, the “subsidised deregulation” approach does not necessarily result 
in an exclusive contract for a single operator.  In its purest form, subsidised deregulation means that 
any operator may provide services on any routes and receive funding.   
 
The key issue to be resolved for the trial, therefore, was how to set the unit rate in a way that achieves 
a competitive process, and allows for more than one operator to provide services.  A number of 
options for establishing unit rates were examined, which can generally be divided into two main 
options, as follows: 
 
 
 
Option 1:  ARC Sets the Rate 
 
In this option, the ARC would set unit rates based on a number of factors taking into account the 
purpose of services and their strategic importance.   
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This option has the advantage of giving the ARC more control over the process and a greater degree 
of certainty for bidders, but there were a number of difficulties: 
 
• There is no outright competitive process to set the price of services, as required by the 
legislation and the Competitive Pricing Procedures approved by Transfund New Zealand. 
 
• It is extremely difficult to decide an appropriate rate (or rates) that will provide sufficient 
incentive to operators so that they deliver increased service and attract increased patronage, 
while not leading to excessive cost to the ARC. 
 
• Budgeting is difficult, as subsidy claims are open ended. 
 
• Since many existing peak services are commercial (ie receiving no subsidy at present), the 
patronage and revenue information necessary to set an appropriate output rate is not readily 
available. 
 
Option 2 :  Tendered Rate 
 
Under this option, which was favoured.  Interested parties are required to tender for: 
 
• An off peak passenger net contract ( as per current ARC process) 
 
and/or  
 
• An output rate for peak passenger stages. 
 
Parties participating in the peak period tender are required to specify the rates (price per passenger 
stages) that they would require for specific volumes of patrons.  The tenderer can specify different 
rates for incremental volumes.  Payments to tenderers are based on the actual volume of passengers 
they carry.  Payment is made by matching the rates to the actual patronage volume, in the order of 
bids received (ie the lowest rate is paid first).  Payments will be made to all eligible participants up to 
the level of the total expenditure cap.  Expenditure caps are pro-rated over each month to ensure 
maximum effectiveness, and to take account of seasonal factors.  Expenditure not taken up in a month 
can be carried forward to future months to provide an ongoing incentive for patronage growth.   
This process requires operators to manage the trade off between patronage projections and the cost of 
supplying vehicle capacity in the peak.  This will be reflected in their rates.  Competitive tension 
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arises from bidders wishing to keep their rate for a specified volume of passenger at a slightly lower 
level than their competitors, so they are “first in line” for the fixed level of funding available. 
 
This approach provides opportunities for new players to enter  the peak period commercial market on 
a non-exclusive basis, provided their rates are competitive.  If they succeed in attracting passengers, 
they will receive output payments accordingly.  Conversely, if they are not successful, they will 
attract little funding.  Unlike the existing net contract approach, incumbents are not excluded from the 
market if they are “beaten” on price. 
 
A key to the success of this approach is the amount of funding made available.  For the trials, the 
ARC has increased the amount by approximately 20% over current levels, to accommodate an 
increase in the level of peak period ridership (which, after all, is the objective of the output based 
funding approach). 
 
Tender Process 
 
Tender documents based on the above procedures were issued in May 1999, with the tender process 
completed in July 1999.  Two areas were chosen for the trials; the Great South Road corridor in South 
Auckland, an area of good existing demand; and the Hibiscus Coast area, a satellite urban area some 
40 kilometres north of the central city, an area of modest demand over longer distances. 
 
Conforming bids were received from three tenderers for the Great South Road corridor (two 
incumbents plus a new entrant) and two tenderers for the Hibiscus Coast (one incumbent plus a new 
entrant).  There was a considerable range of unit rates bid, ranging from $0.05 - $1.00 per passenger 
stage for Great South Road, and $0.10 to $2.00 per passenger stage for the Hibiscus Coast.   
 
Services under the new contract arrangements will commence in both areas in November 1999. 
 
 
Trial Evaluation 
 
The trial is for an initial period of two years, with a right of renewal subject to review of the trial 
outcomes.  The review will assess the trial according to the following criteria: 
 
• Achievement of outcomes (ie reduced demand for vehicle use through increased passenger 
stages). 
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• Value for money - have the outputs been delivered at minimum cost? 
 
• Administration and compliance costs. 
 
• Workability - did the procedures work as intended; were they interpreted consistently by 
operators and the ARC? 
 
• User satisfaction - quality of service, reliability, availability of information. 
 
Issues & Challenges 
 
The approach described above has not been without its difficulties in the development and 
implementation phases - even before the services commence!  The main issues to arise have been: 
 
• The complexity of the tendering process.  Operators had expressed a preference for a fixed 
rate to be set by the ARC, rather than a procedure which required rates to be bid. 
 
• Uncertainty over the level of competition faced by bidders (who must commit to prices for 
given volumes without knowledge of their likely market shares).  This may have resulted in a 
degree of conservatism in the bids, to offset this risk. 
 
• Concern over the extent to which service provision (and public perception) will remain stable 
once services commence).  Because there will be competition on the road, it is reasonable to 
expect some competitive re-positioning once services commence.  Management of these 
changes will be an important challenge for both the ARC and operators. 
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It may be that these problems are such that the alternative mechanism of the ARC establishing the unit 
rate will need to be revisited in the future. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The trial of the “subsidised de-regulation” system of funding in Auckland has followed a lengthy 
period of investigation into ways in which public funding might be better aligned to the achievement 
of outcomes, through a process that provides commercial incentives to service providers.  While 
indicators thus far are promising, the true test will be once the services commence operation under the 
new contract management in November 1999.  Watch this space! 
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